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Abstract
Vaccination is a very effective measure to fight an outbreak of an infectious disease, but it often
suffers from delayed deliveries and limited stockpiles. To use these limited amounts of vaccines effectively,
health agencies can decide to cooperate and share their vaccines. In this paper, we analyze this type of
cooperation. Typically cooperation leads to an increased total return, but cooperation is only plausible
when this total return can be distributed among the agents in a fair way. Using cooperative game theory,
we derive theoretical sufficient conditions under which cooperation is plausible and we show that the
resources can be traded for a market price in those cases. We perform numerical analyses to generalize
these findings and we derive analytical expressions for market prices that can be used in general for
distributing the total return in a fair way. Our results demonstrate that cooperation is a delicate matter.
Cooperation is most likely to be plausible when the total amount of resources is limited or very large. In
those cases, trading resources for a market price often results in a fair allocation of the total return. We
confirm these findings with a case study on the redistribution of influenza vaccines.
Keywords: cooperative game theory, market allocations, core, S-shaped return functions, vaccina-
tion
1 Introduction
Vaccination is a powerful preventive measure to avoid a large outbreak of an infectious disease. However, often
there are insufficient vaccines available to vaccinate the entire population. Various parties, such as health
agencies, may have their own stockpiles of vaccines. To use these limited amounts of vaccines effectively, these
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parties can decide to cooperate and share their vaccines. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC) in the United States allows parties to redistribute or sell their vaccines to others in case of delayed
delivery or another emergency (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2009b). By cooperating, the
limited resources can be used in a smarter way which might lead to increased health benefits. Despite
the fact that cooperation often leads to increased benefits, there can be various political, organizational or
financial reasons why parties are not willing to cooperate. In this paper, we study under which conditions
cooperation is plausible. We consider cooperation to be plausible when there exists an allocation of the total
health benefits among all parties that is advantageous for everyone.
In literature, there are several papers that study cooperation in the context of vaccination. Most of these
papers consider a central planner that coordinates the cooperation and assume that parties are willing to
cooperate if there is individual rationality (i.e., if the benefits of cooperation are such that every individual
party receives at least as much as it could obtain on its own). Sun, Yang, and De Ve´ricourt (2009) and
Wang, de Ve´ricourt, and Sun (2009) model the behavior of countries that can decide to keep their vaccines
for themselves or to donate some vaccines to others. Both papers compare the decentralized solution (i.e., the
situation without cooperation) to the solution of a central planner, such as the World Health Organisation
(WHO). Mamani, Chick, and Simchi-Levi (2013) also consider a central planner, but they do not enforce
cooperation by imposing a solution. Instead, they propose a contract that coordinates the behavior of
countries via subsidies. Such a contract indirectly stimulates countries to cooperate. In contrast to a central
planner who directly or indirectly enforces cooperation, parties can also decide to cooperate themselves.
The fact that cooperation typically leads to increased health benefits provides a motivation for parties to
cooperate.
In our analysis, we study under which conditions parties are willing to cooperate without central coordi-
nation. Thereto, we make use of cooperative game theory. This field deals with the modeling and analysis of
situations in which parties, also called ‘players’, can benefit from coordinating their actions. In this paper,
we introduce and analyze a specific type of cooperative game, a so-called ‘resource pooling game’, in which
players redistribute their resources in an optimal way in order to achieve together a higher total return. A
natural question arises about the allocation among the players of this additional return compared to the
situation without cooperation. We use the concept of the core to find a fair allocation of the total return.
The core is defined as the set of allocations that divide the total return in such a way that no individual
player nor any group of players is worse off. These allocations are therefore an extension to allocations that
only consider individual rationality (Mamani et al., 2013; Sun et al., 2009; Wang et al., 2009).
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We model the benefits that players can obtain from a certain amount of resources with a return function.
The nonlinearities in vaccination give rise to a typical pattern in the return function, which is characterized
by increasing returns to scale in case of limited resources and decreasing returns to scale in case of many
resources (L. E. Duijzer, van Jaarsveld, Wallinga, & Dekker, 2018; Mamani et al., 2013; Wu, Riley, & Leung,
2007). Such type of return functions is also known as S-shaped return functions. For these type of return
functions, we show that cooperation is a delicate matter. Even though cooperation typically leads to an
overall increase of the total return, there is not always a fair way to allocate this total return among the
cooperating players. In addition, we present a number of interesting cases for which cooperation is plausible.
For those cases we present a fair and intuitive allocation with a uniform market price for trading resources.
We numerically study situations in which it is difficult to determine the total return that players can achieve
through cooperation, because of the complexity of the underlying decision problem (i.e., the problem of
redistributing the resources in an optimal way). We analyze whether comparable market prices can be used
in those situations. We conclude that when cooperation is plausible, trading resources for a market price
often results in a fair allocation of the total return and we provide analytical expressions for potential market
prices. We illustrate our findings in a case study on influenza vaccination.
With our analysis we contribute to the literature in two ways. Firstly, we contribute to the literature
on cooperation in vaccination. This literature mainly considers cooperation that is organized via a central
planner. Our results show that under certain conditions, a central planner is not needed to enforce cooper-
ation but that players can organize the cooperation themselves. Secondly, we contribute to the cooperative
game theory literature by being the first to analyze resource pooling games with S-shaped return functions.
Next to applications in vaccination, these type of functions have also been used for returns from investing
into a market (Zschocke, Mantin, & Jewkes, 2013), for sales response in marketing (Abedi, 2017) and for fill
rates in exchangeable-item repair systems (Dreyfuss & Giat, 2017), among others.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. We start with a literature review in Section 2. In
Section 3, we formulate the game and introduce the core. We introduce our ‘market allocations’ and discuss
their relation to the core in Section 4. In Section 5, we derive sufficient conditions under which cooperation
is always plausible and thus and a fair allocation of the total return exists. We generalize these findings
in Section 6. In Section 7, we apply our results to a case study on vaccine distribution. We close with a
discussion and conclusion in Section 8.
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2 Literature
This paper considers a cooperation problem in which multiple parties together decide how a limited amount
of vaccines has to be distributed among multiple groups of individuals. Many papers on vaccine allocation
consider one central decision maker who decides how the available vaccines have to be allocated among the
various regions, age groups or risk groups (L. E. Duijzer, van Jaarsveld, & Dekker, 2018; Keeling & Rohani,
2011, and references therein). In this paper, however, we consider multiple decision makers who each have
an amount of vaccines available. We use cooperative game theory to analyze the cooperation between these
decision makers.
With our cooperative perspective we contribute to the literature on cooperation and coordination in
vaccination. We discuss this literature in Section 2.1. The context of vaccination asks for a cooperative
game formulation that has not been studied before. In Section 2.2, we briefly discuss the related literature
on cooperative game theory. We close with a discussion of the literature on S-shaped return functions in
Section 2.3.
2.1 Cooperation and coordination in vaccination
In literature, many studies of coordination in vaccination focus on the production of vaccines. The various
parties involved in vaccine production often have conflicting objectives. Governments and public health
agencies strive for high vaccine stockpiles. But vaccine producers might not be willing to produce large
amounts, because of the various supply uncertainties that play a role in the production of vaccines. Several
studies use game theory to analyze coordination on the vaccine market via contracts or subsidies (e.g., Adida,
Dey, & Mamani, 2013; Arifogˇlu, Deo, & Iravani, 2012; Chick, Hasija, & Nasiry, 2017; Chick, Mamani, &
Simchi-Levi, 2008; Dai, Cho, & Zhang, 2016).
There are also some studies that apply game theoretical approaches to vaccine allocation problems.
These studies analyze independent agents that decide themselves on the amount of vaccines allocated to
their population. Sun et al. (2009) study an epidemic that starts in a source country and spreads both
within and across countries. Each country has its own stockpile of vaccines and the authors analyze when
countries are willing to give up part of their stockpile or whether they act selfishly. The authors show
that when the transmission from one country to another is small enough, countries either give all their
vaccines to the source country or do not give away anything. Under certain conditions this decentralized
solution can be improved by a central planner who decides how to allocate all resources. Wang et al. (2009)
perform a comparable analysis. They restrict themselves to two countries, but analyze the outbreak with
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a more extensive epidemiological model and for a longer time horizon. They show that the decentralized
solution is equal to the centralized solution when countries are either altruistic and all vaccines are given
to one of the two countries or when every country acts selfishly and keeps his own stockpile. Any other
solution results in more infections for at least one of the countries. Mamani et al. (2013) do not focus on the
allocation of a given amount of vaccines, but on the decision how many vaccines to order. Ordering more
vaccines brings higher purchasing costs, but reduces the costs related to infections. Their model incorporates
characteristics of the models of both Sun et al. (2009) and Wang et al. (2009). Mamani et al. (2013) propose
a coordinating contract in which every country pays a subsidy to the source country where the epidemic
started. This coordinating contract aligns the objectives of the countries and reduces the overall costs for
infections. These papers use non-cooperative game theory and enforce cooperation via contracts. In contrast,
we analyze whether players are willing to cooperate without enforcement and we therefore use cooperative
game theory for our analysis. Although enforced cooperation might be easier to arrange than self-organized
cooperation, other studies have shown that digital tools can help to facilitate self-organized cooperation
(Ergun, Gui, Heier Stamm, Keskinocak, & Swann, 2014).
2.2 Cooperative game theory
Cooperative game theory primarily deals with the modeling and analysis of situations in which groups
of players can benefit from coordinating their actions. In particular, we focus only on a specific class of
cooperative games, namely those in which binding agreements are made between players and side payments
are allowed, i.e., transferable utility (TU) games. For such a cooperative game, one lists for every possible
group of players a single number, representing, for instance, the health benefits for this group of players
when they coordinate their actions. In the theory of cooperative games, an important question is how to
allocate this associated amount when all players decide to cooperate. An allocation rule identifies how to
divide this amount among the participating players for a class of cooperative games. Typically, one strives
for allocation rules with appealing fairness properties. Three, well-known and accepted, fairness properties
are efficiency (i.e., the amount should be allocated completely), individual rationality (i.e., everyone player
gets at least what he would get while acting alone) and coalitional stability (i.e., every group of players gets
at least what they would get while acting together). The set of allocations that does satisfy these properties
together is better known as the core (Gillies, 1959).
The game that we study in this paper belongs to the class of operations research (OR) games, a stream
of literature that studies TU games, arising from underlying situations in which a group of collaborating
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players faces a joint optimization problem (see, e.g., Borm, Hamers, & Hendrickx, 2001, for a review on
OR games). In particular, within this class of OR games, our game can be recognized as a resource pooling
game. In such a game, resources are reallocated, or shared among players to realize additional profit (or
reduce costs). In the last couple of years, there is an increasing interest in these games, especially with a
focus on logistics. Some examples are the reallocation of inventory in a retail setting (Sosˇic´, 2006), pooling
of emergency vehicles in health care (Karsten, Slikker, & Van Houtum, 2015), pooling of technicians in the
service industry (Anily & Haviv, 2010), pooling of capacity in a production environment (Anily & Haviv,
2017; O¨zen, Reiman, & Wang, 2011), pooling of spare parts in the capital intensive goods industry (Guajardo
& Ro¨nnqvist, 2015; Karsten & Basten, 2014; Karsten, Slikker, & van Houtum, 2012), and reallocation of
repair vans, tamping machines, and spare parts in a railway setting (Schlicher, Slikker, & van Houtum,
2017a, 2017b, 2018). To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to focus on a resource pooling game with
an application in vaccination.
In a broader perspective, our game can be recognized as a slightly modified version of market games
(Shapley & Shubik, 1969). In these games, which are studied intensively in literature (see e.g., Osborne &
Rubinstein, 1994), each player is associated with a set of resources and a convex utility function, identifying
the amount of profit realized for the given set of resources. Players can cooperate by reallocating resources
to maximize the sum of the convex utility functions. Shapley and Shubik (1969) show that the core of
these market games is always non-empty, by providing an intuitive market allocation. Debreu and Scarf
(1963) show that core non-emptiness of market games is no longer guaranteed when utility functions are
non-convex. We study a modified version of market games, since we consider the utility function (per player)
to be S-shaped (i.e., convex-concave). To the best of our knowledge, there are no market games nor resource
pooling games in literature that consider the specific individual utility function with a convex-concave form.
2.3 S-shaped return functions
The decision problem underlying our cooperative game, is a resource allocation problem with S-shaped
return functions to measure the return obtained from a certain number of resources. The S-shape establishes
convex returns for limited amounts of resources and concave returns in case of many resources. S-shaped
return functions are used to express the relation between the number of distributed vaccines and the health
benefits/costs in a population (Chick et al., 2017; L. E. Duijzer, van Jaarsveld, Wallinga, & Dekker, 2018;
Mamani et al., 2013), but also in marketing (e.g., Abedi, 2017; Ag˘ralı & Geunes, 2009). Although S-shaped
return functions have various applications, decision problems involving these functions are in general difficult.
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Ag˘ralı and Geunes (2009) even show that a resource allocation problem involving such return functions is
NP-hard. Several methods have been proposed to find solutions for this problem. Ginsberg (1974) was the
first to consider this problem and he derived conditions under which the optimal solution can be described
analytically. Based on these analytical solutions, L. E. Duijzer, van Jaarsveld, Wallinga, and Dekker (2018)
developed a heuristic which works well for vaccine allocation problems. Ag˘ralı and Geunes (2009) and
Srivastava and Bullo (2014) approach the problem theoretically and develop approximation algorithms with
theoretical performance guarantees and polynomial time complexity. Although the computation time of
these approaches is polynomial, the computation time can be quite large for large instances or when a high
precision is required. Abedi (2017) analyze a more general version of the problem in which the return
functions are correlated. They study an application in marketing and develop a branch and cut algorithm.
In this paper, we need to solve a resource allocation problem with S-shaped return functions for every
possible group of players in order to determine whether cooperation is plausible. This implies that the
number of NP-hard problems we need to solve is exponential in the number of players. We therefore prefer a
solution approach that is very fast. We use the heuristic of L. E. Duijzer, van Jaarsveld, Wallinga, and Dekker
(2018), which is shown to work well in the context of vaccination. If possible (i.e., for small instances), we
will use complete enumeration to determine the optimal solution of the NP-hard resource allocation problem.
3 Problem
The cooperation problem in vaccination that we study in this paper is an application of a general cooperation
problem in resource allocation. We formulate our problem and our results in terms of general resources and
return to the application of vaccination in the case study in Section 7. This way of formulating emphasizes
the generality of our problem and our contribution to the literature on cooperative game theory.
We formulate our problem and the corresponding cooperative game in Section 3.1. In Section 3.2, we
discuss the type of allocations that we are interested in. In Section 3.3, we show that these desirable
allocations do not always exists.
3.1 Cooperative game formulation
We consider a finite set of players N and every player i ∈ N initially has some resources ri ≥ 0. The value
that player i ∈ N obtains from a certain amount of resources is determined by the S-shaped return function
Fi(·). We assume that Fi(·) only depends on the amount of resources of player i, and not on the resources
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of the other players. For a discussion of this assumption we refer to Section 8. We assume that the return
function for every player i ∈ N satisfies the following three conditions.
Assumption 1. Consider a return function Fi(·), then:
1. Fi(·) is continuous, non-negative and non-decreasing,
2. Fi(·) is strictly convex on the interval [0, ci) and strictly concave on (ci,+∞) for some ci ≥ 0,
3. Fi(af) < aFi(f) on the interval f ∈ [di,+∞) for some di ≥ ci and for any a > 1.
The S-shaped function captures the structure of increasing returns to scale when a player has few re-
sources, but decreasing returns to scale when he has many resources. Condition (3) of Assumption 1 guar-
antees decreasing returns to scale. Functions that satisfy the conditions in Assumption 1 are referred to as
nicely convex-concave by Ginsberg (1974).
We discuss in more detail how we measure the return of a player. Let Mi > 0 denote the size of player
i. For example, when a player corresponds to a geographic region, this size can represent the number of
inhabitants in that region. W.l.o.g. we assume that the return function measures the fractional return for
a player, i.e., the actual return for player i is equal to MiFi(·). Furthermore, we assume that the return
depends on the ratio of the amount of resources and the size of the player. For example, player i obtains a
value MiFi(r/Mi) from r resources. If the same amount of resources were given to player j, then he would
obtain a value of MjFj(r/Mj). This type of return function is common in vaccination (E. Duijzer, van
Jaarsveld, Wallinga, & Dekker, 2016; L. E. Duijzer, van Jaarsveld, Wallinga, & Dekker, 2018; Mamani et al.,
2013), where the players represent populations and Mi denotes the number of individuals in population i.
When there are r vaccines available for population i, then r/Mi represents the fraction of the population that
can be vaccinated. Then, Fi(r/Mi) measures per individual the monetary health benefits that are the result
of distributing r vaccines in population i. We note that this modeling choice is not restrictive, because any
return function that satisfies Assumption 1 can be rewritten to model the fractional return. To illustrate,
for any return function G(·) that satisfies Assumption 1 and measures the total return that a player of size
M obtains from a number of resources, we can construct a function F (·) that also satisfies Assumption 1
but measures the fractional return, by setting F (r/M) = G(r)/M for all r ≥ 0.
We introduce our game as a pair (N, v), where N ⊆ N represents the set of players and v : 2N → R
denotes the value function which is introduced in this section. We use the term ‘coalition’ to refer to a
subset of players S ⊆ N . The total set of players N is referred to as the grand coalition. The value function
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v(S) measures the maximum return that a coalition of players S ⊆ N can achieve by redistributing their
resources without the help of the players in N\S. This maximum return for coalition S ⊆ N is equal to the
value of the following optimization problem:
v(S) = max
∑
i∈S
MiFi (fi)
s.t.
∑
i∈S
fiMi ≤
∑
i∈S
ri
fi ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ S,
(1)
In Problem (1), the decision variable fi for all i ∈ S represents the fraction of resources player i receives
relative to its size Mi, when player i is cooperating with all other players in S. In literature, the above
problem per coalition, is referred to as a knapsack problem with S-shaped return functions (e.g., Ag˘ralı &
Geunes, 2009; Ginsberg, 1974; Srivastava & Bullo, 2014). Ag˘ralı and Geunes (2009) show that this problem
is NP-hard.
We illustrate our game with the following example. Because of the NP-hardness of Problem (1) it is
difficult to determine the value function v(·). We therefore use discretized enumeration with step size 10−4
to approximate the value function and we round the numerical values to four decimal places. This implies
that the actual value function can deviate from the reported numbers. However, because the return function
is continuous and non-decreasing (Assumption 1) this deviation is small and it does not affect the message
of the example.
Example 1: Consider a situation with three identical players. Let Fi(f) =
1
1+exp{−45f+25} for i = 1, 2, 3.
Furthermore, M = [1, 1, 1] and r = [0.2, 0.2, 0.2]. It can be verified that
v({i}) = 1
1 + exp{−45(ri/Mi) + 25} =
1
1 + exp{16} = 0 for i = 1, 2, 3.
When the three players cooperate, they can achieve a higher return by giving all resources to one player.
This results in
v(N) =
1
1 + exp{−45 · (3/5) + 25} +
1
1 + exp{−45 · 0 + 25} +
1
1 + exp{−45 · 0 + 25} = 0.8808.
4
Example 1 demonstrates that cooperation can increase the total return. When all players keep their
resources to themselves, the total return is approximately equal to zero. But combining the resources results
in a total return of almost 0.9. In this case, the high return could be achieved because one player benefited
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from the willingness of the other players to give away their resources. However, a player is only willing to
give away (part of) his resources if he can also benefit from the increased return of the other player. In
the next section, we therefore discuss how the total return, achieved through cooperation, can be allocated
among the players.
3.2 The core
To find a fair allocation of the total return, we use the concept of the core (Gillies, 1959) from cooperative
game theory. The core of a game is formally defined as the set of all allocations x ∈ RN that satisfy the
following conditions:
Efficiency
∑
i∈N
xi = v(N)
Stability
∑
i∈S
xi ≥ v(S) ∀S ⊂ N
(2)
The efficiency condition guarantees that the total return is divided among all players. By the (coalitional)
stability conditions, this division is done in such a way that no coalition of players can improve their return
by leaving the grand coalition. Stability is thus stronger than individual rationality, which would only require
that no individual player is willing to leave the grand coalition (xi ≥ v({i}) for all i ∈ N). Core allocations
are desirable, because they provide a fair way to divide the total return.
We illustrate the concept of the core in the following example. Recall that all numerical values are
rounded to four decimal places.
Example 1 (continued): The return function of the three identical players is illustrated in Figure 1.
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
0.5
1
f
F
i(
f
)
Figure 1: Graphical representation of the return function: Fi(f) =
1
1+exp{−45f+25} .
Given that r = [0.2, 0.2, 0.2], one can derive from Figure 1 that every coalition of players maximizes its return
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by giving all resources to one player. This results in the following value function:
S {1} {2} {3} {1, 2} {1, 3} {2, 3} {1, 2, 3}
v(S) 0 0 0 0.0009 0.0009 0.0009 0.8808
One can verify that x =
[
0.8808
3 ,
0.8808
3 ,
0.8808
3
]
satisfies the efficiency and stability conditions, which implies
that x is a core allocation. 4
In Example 1, resources are scarce with respect to Fi(·) and Mi for all i ∈ N . The return that a single
player obtains from his resources is negligible and the same holds when two players cooperate. Only when
three players cooperate, they can obtain a high return. This implies that the fair allocation which divides
the total return equally among all players is in the core. Moreover, practically any allocation in which each
player receives a strictly positive share is in the core, because a player can almost never obtain a higher
return in any subcoalition. We note that, in order to satisfy the stability conditions, every subcoalition
consisting of two players should receive at least 0.0009. Therefore, the allocation in which all return is given
to a single player is not in the core, even though this allocation is efficient and individually rational.
The simple setting of Example 1 illustrates the existence of core allocations. However, it is possible that
the core is empty, meaning that no allocation exists that satisfies the efficiency and stability conditions in
(2). In this paper, we argue that the existence of a core allocation is necessary for cooperation. However,
the existence of a core allocation does not automatically imply that all players are also willing to cooperate
with each other. There might still be other (political, organizational, financial) reasons not to do so. We
therefore say that cooperation is plausible when the core is non-empty.
3.3 An empty core
With the following example we illustrate that the core can be empty. We again determine the value function
via discretized enumeration with step size 10−4 and round the numerical values to four decimal places.
Example 2: Consider a situation with three identical players: M = [1, 1, 1] and r =
[
1
3 ,
1
3 ,
1
3
]
. Let Fi(f) =
1
1+exp{−45f+25} , for i = 1, 2, 3. One can conclude from Figure 1 that every coalition of players maximizes its
return by giving all resources to one player. This results in the following value function:
S {1} {2} {3} {1, 2} {1, 3} {2, 3} {1, 2, 3}
v(S) 0 0 0 0.9933 0.9933 0.9933 1.0000
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We will show that the core of this game is empty. Suppose for the sake of contradiction there exists an
allocation x ∈ R3 that satisfies the efficiency and stability conditions. Then,
x1 = v(N)− x2 − x3 by the efficiency condition
≤ 1.0000− 0.9933 by the stability condition: x2 + x3 ≥ v({2, 3})
= 0.0067
Analogously, we can derive that x2 ≤ 0.0067 and x3 ≤ 0.0067. This implies that x1 + x2 + x3 ≤ 0.0201 <
1.0000 = v(N). Hence, there is no allocation that satisfies both the efficiency and the stability conditions.
And thus, the core is empty. 4
The intuition behind an empty core is related to the convex-concave shape of the return function. This
shape establishes the existence of a sweet spot that strikes the right balance between the increasing and
decreasing returns to scale. In Figure 1, this sweet spot is somewhere around f = 0.65. Having more
resources does hardly increase the return, but having less resources will result in a big loss. Resources are
deployed in the most effective way around this sweet spot. If the total amount of resources is such that this
sweet spot is not reached in the grand coalition, then v(N) suffers from loss in effectiveness. This is what
we see in Example 2 where some resources are not used in the most effective way in the grand coalition. In
those cases, it is likely that a smaller coalition of players can use their own resources more effectively. In
Example 2, this applies to any coalition of two players. These coalitions of players will only join the grand
coalition, if they are compensated for their loss in effectiveness. However, there might be no players willing
to pay for this compensation, such as in the above example. This leads to an empty core.
4 Market allocations
Core allocations satisfy a set of clear conditions, but their actual interpretation can be difficult. We therefore
propose another type of allocations, so-called market allocations, that have a clear and intuitive structure.
In Section 4.1, we introduce our market allocations. We discuss the relation between market allocations
and the core in Section 4.2. In Section 4.3, we present a theoretical result on games with two players by
showing that for two player games the core is always non-empty and that all core allocations are also market
allocations.
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4.1 Introduction market allocations
We introduce a particular type of allocation, namely those with a market price. Let f∗ = [f∗i ]i∈N denote an
optimal solution to Problem (1) for the grand coalition N . Then, any allocation y ∈ RN can be written as
yi = MiFi (f
∗
i ) + pi (ri − f∗iMi) ∀i ∈ N. (3)
Above allocation can be interpreted as follows. All players cooperate and determine the best possible division
of all resources, i.e., f∗. Each of them obtains a certain return from the resources that he gets in this division.
This return corresponds to MiF (f
∗
i ) for every player i ∈ N . Some players end up with less resources than
they initially had and others with more. To compensate for the loss of resources, players receive some money.
At the same time, players that have received more resources have to pay for the extra resources. From the
allocation y we can determine a price pi per resource bought/sold for every player i. We call an allocation
y a market allocation if pi = pj for all i, j ∈ N . That implies that there exists a single price p, called the
market price. All players either sell or buy resources for this market price. Such a market price is likely to
enhance cooperation in practice, because it prevents having dissatisfied players who found out that other
players have bought (sold) resources for a lower (higher) price.
4.2 Market allocations and the core
Although market allocations have a nice and clear interpretation, their relation to the core is not always
clear. For special types of games, so-called ‘market games’ the core is always non-empty and there is always
a market allocation in the core (see our discussion in Section 2), but this does not hold for the game that
we consider in this paper. For our game, the core can be empty. Nevertheless, market allocations can be
constructed for any situation and thus market allocations always exist, even if the core is empty. Conversely,
it is also possible to have a non-empty core that does not contain a market allocation. This is illustrated
with the following example. Again, we determine the value function via discretized enumeration and present
the numerical values rounded to four decimal places.
Example 3: Consider a situation with three players: Mi = 1 for i = 1, 2, 3 and r = [0.1, 1, 0.65]. Let
Fi(f) =
1
1+exp{−45f+25} , for i = 1, 2, 3. The corresponding value function is as follows:
S {1} {2} {3} {1, 2} {1, 3} {2, 3} {1, 2, 3}
v(S) 0 1.0000 0.9859 1.0000 0.9998 2.0000 2.3319
One can easily verify that following allocation x = [0.1319, 1.1, 1.1] is in the core and thus the core is non-
empty. Although the core is non-empty, we will show that there is no market allocation that belongs to
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the core. By contradiction, suppose there exists a market allocation y with market price p that belongs
to the core. Via enumeration we can determine that the optimal distribution of resources for the grand
coalition is as follows: f∗i =
1.75
3 = 0.5833, with Fi(f
∗
i ) = 0.7773 for i = 1, 2, 3. To move towards the optimal
distribution f∗, player 1 has to buy some resources and player 2 and 3 have to sell some of their resources.
By stability of allocation y, the following can be derived for the market price that players 1 and 3 are willing
to pay/receive:
y1 = M1F1(f
∗
1 ) + p(r1 − f∗1M1) ≥ v({1}) ⇔ p ≤
0.7773− 0
0.5833− 0.1 = 1.6083
y3 = M3F3(f
∗
3 ) + p(r3 − f∗3M1) ≥ v({3}) ⇔ p ≥
0.9859− 0.7773
0.65− 0.5833 = 3.1274
Hence, player 1 is willing to pay a price per resource at most equal to 1.6083. However, player 3 wants to
receive at least 3.1274 per resource. This implies that there is no market price that satisfies the individual
rationality condition of both player 1 and 3. Hence, there is no market allocation y that is in the core, even
though the core is non-empty. 4
The fact that there is no market price in Example 3 is again caused by the convex-concave shape of
the return function. Player 3 is initially at the sweet spot and by selling some resources he looses a lot in
effectiveness. Since player 1 is the only player that buys resources, he needs to pay a high price to compensate
player 3. However, in case of a market price, player 1 must also pay the same high price for the resources he
buys from player 2. Player 1 is not willing to do so and therefore there is no market allocation in the core.
The fact that the core is non-empty can be explained as follows. We can use equation (3) to determine
the prices p1, p2, p3 that follow from the core allocation x = [0.1319, 1.1, 1.1]. We find that p1 = 1.3354,
p2 = 0.7744 and p3 = 4.8381. Note that player 2 and 3 are sellers, so they sell their resources at different
prices. Player 1 is the only buyer: he buys 1-0.5833=0.4167 resources from player 2 for a price p2 per resource
and he buys 0.65-0.5833 =0.0667 resources from player 3 for a price p3 per resource. On average he pays
the price p1 per resource. We see that player 1 buys a few resources for a very high price and most of the
resources for a low price, resulting in an acceptable average price for this player. In this way, all players are
willing to cooperate with each other.
In general, Example 3 shows that the requirement of a single market price can be quite restrictive. There
can be many allocations belonging to the core that correspond to individual prices for the players.
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4.3 Two players
In the previous sections, we have seen that the core can be empty and that a market allocation that belongs
to the core does not necessarily exist. In this section, we provide an interesting result for games with two
players. These games have the elegant structure that one player gives (part of) his resources to the other
player. Thus, there is one ‘buyer’ (denoted with the letter b) and one ‘seller’ (denoted with the letter s). The
following theorem shows that in case of two players the core is non-empty. Moreover, all core allocations are
also market allocations. The proof of this theorem can be found in Appendix A.
Theorem 1. In the case of two players (i.e., |N | = 2) the core is equal to the set of all market allocations
with a market price
p ∈
Ms
[
Fs
(
rs
Ms
)
− Fs(f∗s )
]
rs −Msf∗s
,
Mb
[
Fb(f
∗
b )− Fb
(
rb
Mb
)]
Mbf∗b − rb
 .
Theorem 1 can intuitively be explained as follows. The market price compensates the seller for selling
his resources. Therefore, this price must be high enough for the seller and at the same time not too high for
the buyer. Such a price exists, because by redistributing the resources the players can achieve at least the
same total return as on their own. For two players, all core allocations are market price allocations, because
one player buys resources from the other. There are no other players involved, and hence the compensation
that the seller receives for giving away resources is completely paid by the buyer.
5 Identical return functions
In the previous section, we have seen that the core is always non-empty for games with two players, but that
for more than two players the core can be empty. In this section, we study conditions for games with |N |
players under which the core is non-empty and a market allocation is in the core. To do so, we consider a
class of games where all players have the same return function: i.e., Fi(·) = F (·) for all i ∈ N .
Identical return functions can be motivated as follows. Consider the example of vaccine allocation, then
every player i corresponds to a population consisting of a certain number of individuals Mi. The return
function Fi(f) then measures per individual the monetary health benefits of vaccinating a fraction f of the
population. If all regions face an outbreak of the same infectious disease that spreads through the population
in a similar way, then we can assume that these regions respond similarly to vaccination and that their return
functions are identical (L. E. Duijzer, van Jaarsveld, Wallinga, & Dekker, 2018; Keeling & Shattock, 2012).
We start in Section 5.1 with analyzing the characteristics of the value function. Based on these charac-
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teristics, we derive sufficient conditions for the core to be non-empty in Section 5.2. We do so by providing
a market allocation that is in the core.
5.1 Analysis of the value function
To analyze this game, we first analyze the value function. The following lemma shows that any coalition
of players can always use all the resources they have. This lemma follows directly from the fact that the
functions Fi(·) are non-negative and non-decreasing (see Assumption 1).
Lemma 1. For every coalition S ⊆ N , there always exists an optimal solution f∗ ∈ RS to Problem (1) for
which
∑
i∈S f
∗
iMi =
∑
i∈S ri.
To investigate in what way the players will divide their resources when they cooperate, we introduce
the following concept. Let the function DF (·) measure the additional return per resource for a player with
return function F (·) (cf., L. E. Duijzer, van Jaarsveld, Wallinga, & Dekker, 2018). The additional return is
the return that is obtained from the resources compared to having no resources at all. In many applications
having no resources also implies no return (i.e., F (0) = 0), but this need not always be the case. For example,
in case nobody is vaccinated during an epidemic there might still be health benefits related to individuals
escaping infection the by chance. The function DF (·) is defined as follows:
DF (f) =
1
f
[F (f)− F (0)] for all f > 0 (4)
Note that DF (f) can also be interpreted as the average slope of the return function F (·) on the interval [0, f ].
We derive the following result, which follows from the characteristics of the function F (·) in Assumption 1.
Corollary 1. The function DF (·) is maximized by the unique fraction of resources f˜F for which F ′(f˜F ) =
DF (f˜F ). Moreover, DF (·) is increasing on the interval [0, f˜F ) and decreasing on the interval (f˜F ,∞).
Corollary 1 is illustrated in Figure 2. This figure shows that there is a unique fraction of resources, f˜F ,
for which the additional return per resource is the highest. This fraction is unique because of the nicely
convex-concave shape of the function F (·). The resource fraction f˜F can be interpreted as the sweet spot
that strikes the right balance between the convex and concave part of the return function.
The fraction f˜F plays an important role in the optimal solution to Problem (1). This is illustrated in the
following theorem, which is based on Theorem 5 of L. E. Duijzer, van Jaarsveld, Wallinga, and Dekker (2018).
From now on, we denote the total amount of resources for a coalition of players S ⊆ N by R(S) = ∑i∈S ri.
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Figure 2: This figure illustrates the existence and uniqueness of f˜F in the following S-shaped return
function: F (f) = exp{0.75− 0.5/f}.
Theorem 2. In the case of identical return functions (Fi(·) = F (·) for all i ∈ N) the optimal solution
f∗ ∈ RS for every coalition S ⊆ N to Problem (1) for particular cases is as follows:
(a). If R(S) < f˜F mini∈S{Mi}, then it is best to give all resources to the player with the smallest size. Let
k ∈ arg mini∈S{Mi}, then the optimal solution is given by f∗k = R(S)Mk and f∗j = 0 for j ∈ S\{k}.
(b). If R(S) =
∑
j∈K f˜FMj for some K ⊆ S, then it is best to divide the resources pro rata among the
players in K. The optimal solution is given by f∗j =
R(S)∑
i∈KMi
= f˜F for j ∈ K and f∗j = 0 for
j ∈ S\{K}.
(c). If R(S) >
∑
j∈S f˜FMj, then it is best to divide all resources pro rata over all the players. The optimal
solution is given by f∗j =
R(S)∑
i∈SMi
for all j ∈ S.
Above theorem shows that in order to make the best possible use of the return functions, the optimal
solution tries to be close to f˜F for (a subset of) the players. If it is possible to give a subset of players exactly
the resource fraction f˜F , then this is optimal (case (b)). If the fraction f˜F cannot be attained for any of the
players, then it is best to give all resources to the player with the smallest size (case (a)). In that case, there
are very few resources and one can benefit the most from the convex part of the return function by setting
the resource fraction as high as possible. This can be achieved by prioritizing the smallest player, because
the resource fraction fi = R(N)/Mi is higher for a player i with a small size Mi. When there are many
resources, it is best to divide them pro rata over all players (case (c)).
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5.2 Core allocations
In this section, we derive sufficient conditions under which the core is non-empty. We show that in those
cases there is a market allocation in the core. That means that in those cases, cooperation with all players
is plausible and the total return is divided in such a way that all players buy and sell resources for the same
price. We provide analytical expressions for these market prices and compare these prices to a simple price
that could be used as a rule of thumb. This simple price is based on the intuition that the price of a resource
is equal to the total additional return divided by the total amount of resources. To formalize this intuition,
we introduce A(N) as the average additional return per resource when all players in N cooperate.
A(N) =
v(N)−∑i∈N MiFi(0)
R(N)
(5)
Observe that the numerator of above expression represents the total additional return that is gained compared
to having no resources at all. This total additional return is divided by the total amount of resources.
Let us now analyze the cases for which we can show that a market allocation is in the core. To do so, we
use the three cases of Theorem 2 for which the value function can easily be determined. The proofs of the
theorems in this section can be found in Appendix A. The following theorem considers the case of scarcity,
i.e, when there are very few resources in total (case (a) of Theorem 2).
Theorem 3. Consider identical return functions (Fi(·) = F (·) for all i ∈ N) and let k ∈ arg mini∈N{Mi}.
If R(N) < f˜FMk, then the market allocation with price DF
(
R(N)
Mk
)
is in the core. This implies that the core
is non-empty.
Theorem 3 can intuitively be explained as follows: when resources are scarce, the highest possible return
is achieved when all resources are given to the player with the smallest size. This results in an additional
return of DF
(
R(N)
Mk
)
per resource. Every coalition of players can obtain no more than this, because of
the limited amount of resources and the convex part of the return function. Therefore, every coalition of
players is happy if they can receive an additional return of DF
(
R(N)
Mk
)
per resource. This corresponds to the
market price of the proposed allocation. Moreover, one can verify that DF
(
R(N)
Mk
)
= A(N) for the situation
described in Theorem 3.
The core is not only non-empty in case of scarcity, but also when the total amount of resources is such
that we can exactly provide a subset of players with the most efficient fraction of resources f˜F (case (b) of
Theorem 2).
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Theorem 4. Consider identical return functions (Fi(·) = F (·) for all i ∈ N). If R(N) = f˜F
∑
i∈KMi for
some K ⊆ N , then the market allocation with price DF
(
f˜F
)
is in the core. This implies that the core is
non-empty.
To prove this theorem, we make use of duality for convex non-linear optimization problems. Deriving core
allocations using duality theory is often done for linear optimization problems (Deng, Ibaraki, & Nagamochi,
1999; Owen, 1975), we extend this approach to non-linear problems.
To interpret Theorem 4, recall that the additional gain per resource, DF (·), is maximized for f˜F . Hence,
any subset of players can never obtain an additional gain per resource higher than DF
(
f˜F
)
. The proposed
allocation gives every player i ∈ N exactly DF
(
f˜F
)
per resource for his initial amount of resources ri. This
implies that no player can be better off on his own or in a coalition. Therefore, the market allocation of
Theorem 4 is in the core.
This can be also seen in Figure 2. In this figure, the dashed line can be interpreted as the relation between
the initial amount of resources ri/Mi (on the horizontal axis) for player i which has f
∗
i = f˜F and the market
allocation with a market price DF
(
f˜F
)
(on the vertical axis). The difference between the dashed line and
the S-curve can be interpreted as the willingness of player i to pay/receive the price DF
(
f˜F
)
. Since, the
dashed line lies above the S-curve, this player is always willing to sell/buy resources for this price p until he
has f˜FMi resources.
Similar to the case of scarcity, we can show that for any situation satisfying the conditions of Theorem 4
it holds that DF
(
f˜F
)
= A(N).
Finally, we can also show non-emptiness of the core when there is an oversupply of resources (case (c) of
Theorem 2). The following theorem presents a core-allocation:
Theorem 5. Consider identical return functions (Fi(·) = F (·) for all i ∈ N). If R(N) ≥ f˜F
∑
i∈N Mi, then
the allocation with the market price F ′
(
R(N)∑
i∈N Mi
)
is in the core. This implies that the core is non-empty.
We can intuitively explain Theorem 5 as follows. By Theorem 2, we know that all players receive a
fraction of resources equal to f∗ = R(N)∑
i∈N Mi
when the total amount of resources is high enough. This implies
that the market price of Theorem 5 is equal to F ′(f∗). When the price is such, no player is willing to deviate
from the optimal resource distribution f∗ by buying or selling resources. If the price would be higher than
F ′(f∗), players would rather sell some more resources. The money they would get by selling some resources,
is higher than the return they can obtain by keeping them. Similarly, with a price lower than F ′(f∗) players
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would rather buy some more resources. Hence, when the price is exactly equal to F ′(f∗) no player is willing
to deviate from the optimal resource distribution.
When there are many resources, the value of a resource will go down. Players with many resources are
therefore willing to sell some of their resources for a relatively low price. Rewriting the market price of
Theorem 5 gives the following:
F ′
(
R(N)∑
j∈N Mj
)
≤ DF
(
R(N)∑
j∈N Mj
)
= A(N)
The inequality follows from the fact that DF (f) ≥ F ′(f) for f ≥ f˜F (Corollary 1). Above analysis shows
that in this case the market price is smaller than the average additional return per resource A(N). This
contradicts the result of Theorems 3 and 4, where the market price is equal to the A(N). To explain this
difference, we recall that the function DF (f) measures the additional return per resource for a player. This
additional return is increasing for f ≤ f˜F and decreasing for f > f˜F .
Both in Theorem 3 and 4 the total amount of resources is such that in the optimal division of resources,
all players will receive an amount of resources in the region of increasing additional returns. This implies
that any player who buys resources, will obtain a higher return per resource from the resources he bought
than from the resources he initially had. Since both the initial resources and the bought resources contribute
to A(N), this player is willing to pay the price A(N) for the resources he buys.
In contrast, in Theorem 5 there is such an abundance of resources, that in the optimal division of resources
all players receive an amount of resources in the region of decreasing additional returns. This implies that
a player who buys resources will potentially have a higher return per resource for his initial resources, than
for the resources he buys. The return per resource for the bought resources might be even lower than the
average return A(N). Therefore, this player might only be willing to pay a price less than A(N) for the
resources he buys.
6 General case
In the previous section, we have identified situations for which we showed non-emptiness of the core by
providing a market allocation that belongs to the core. That implies that for those specific situations,
cooperation is plausible and the benefits achieved through cooperation can be allocated in a fair way via
buying and selling all resources for a market price. In this section, we study the general case without
assuming identical return functions or restrictions on the total amount of resources R(N). We investigate
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for this general case when cooperation is plausible by analyzing the non-emptiness of the core in Section 6.1.
In Section 6.2, we derive expressions for market price candidates of which we expect that the corresponding
market allocation is in the core. To evaluate our proposed market allocations, we compare them to a number
of benchmark allocations. The numerical results on the performance of the different allocations can be found
in Section 6.3.
6.1 Non-emptiness of the core
In this section, we study the possibilities of cooperation. Cooperation is plausible when the core is non-empty,
but it becomes complicated in case of an empty core. The conditions that describe the core depend on the
value function of our cooperative game. Therefore, in order to be able to determine whether the core is empty
or not we first need to determine the value function for every coalition. In many cases, however, the value
function is difficult to determine, because of the NP-hardness of Problem (1). This is particularly true when
the players do not have identical return functions, because then the results of Theorem 2 no longer hold.
To overcome this problem, we propose to approximate the value function by means of an approximation for
Problem (1). In literature, there are more studies that approximate the value function when this function is
difficult to determine (cf., Goemans & Skutella, 2004; Zeng, Zhang, Cai, & Li, 2018).
In contract to the small examples that we discussed before, it is no longer possible to approximate
the value function with complete enumeration. Therefore, from now on we use the heuristic proposed by
L. E. Duijzer, van Jaarsveld, Wallinga, and Dekker (2018), which is shown to perform close to optimal for
a similar optimization problem. We refer to Appendix B.1 for a complete description of our approximation.
We use v¯(S) to denote the approximation of the value function for every coalition S ⊆ N .
When we talk about the core, we technically mean the core of the game with the approximated value
function. Moreover, because we approximate the value function, we have to be careful with numerical
precision. Therefore, we introduce a slack parameter  to account for small deviations. We set  = 10−5
and we consider the -core: all allocations x that satisfy the efficiency condition (
∑
i∈N xi = v¯(N)) and the
stability conditions (
∑
i∈S xi ≥ v¯(S) −  for all S ⊂ N) determined with the approximated value functions
v¯(·). For the reader’s convenience, we will simply refer to the core instead of the -core.
To analyze the non-emptiness of the core, we randomly generate instances with five players. We analyze
identical return functions (the same function for all players) and individual return functions (functions may
differ between the players). We use the following two types of return functions that are commonly used to
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model a convex-concave shape and that both satisfy Assumption 1.
(i) Fi(f) = exp{ai − bi/f},
(ii) Fi(f) =
1
1+exp{−aif+bi} .
Type (i) functions are also used by Ginsberg (1974) and type (ii) is the well-known logistic function. For
return functions of type (i) we generate ai and bi randomly on the interval [0, 1] for all i ∈ N . For these
functions, f˜Fi = bi. For type (ii) functions we randomly generate ai ∈ [25, 100] and bi ∈ [0, ai] for all i ∈ N .
This ensures that f˜Fi also lies in the interval [0,1] for almost all generated instances. The population sizes
Mi are randomly generated on the interval [10,100]. The initial amount of resources for player i is randomly
generated on the interval
[
0, df˜FiMi
]
, where we let d ∈ {0.05, 0.5, 1, 1.5, ..., 10}. The case that d = 0 is
not interesting, since this would imply that none of the players have resources and thus R(N) = 0. A low
value of d results in a game where players have relatively few resources. For high values of d there are many
resources available.
Figure 3 shows how often the core is non-empty for different values of d. We can easily determine whether
the core is empty or not by analyzing whether there is a feasible solution that satisfies the core conditions
(see Appendix B.2 for a full description).
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Figure 3: This figure presents the fraction of instances for which the core is non-empty. We take the
average over 500 generated instances with five players and we analyze both identical return functions ( )
and individual return functions ( ).
Figure 3 shows that the core is non-empty in most of the cases. Only for moderate amounts of resource
(d ∈ [0.5, 3]) the core is empty more often. For five players the fraction of instances with an empty core is
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never below 0.40. Additional results, not reported here, show that this fraction is decreasing in the number
of players and that it drops to around 0.10 for d = 0.5 in case of ten players and individual type (ii) return
functions. When there are very few or many resources, the core is (almost) never empty. This can be
explained as follows. When there are very few resources, the return of individual players and small coalitions
is almost zero (cf., Example 1). Only when all players cooperate and all resources can be given to one player,
increased benefits can be expected. This implies that any coalition of players is already satisfied with a small
share of the total return, which makes it easy to find a core allocation. In case of many resources, there are
(almost) always some players that initially have many resources of which some are worth almost nothing to
them. The players with fewer resources can then buy resources from these players for relatively low prices.
This likely results in a non-empty core.
We can thus conclude that cooperation is plausible when there are almost no or many resources, but
that one must be careful when the total amount of resources is moderate. In practice however, the case
of relative scarcity might be the most interesting case to cooperate. When resources are relatively scarce,
players are dependent on each other and they can expect to increase the total return through cooperation.
Yet the results in this section show that, particularly in case of relative scarcity, finding a fair way to divide
the total return among the players can be difficult and might not even be possible.
6.2 Market price allocations
When the core is non-empty, we would like to find a fair division of the total return. We have seen that
market allocations are good candidates for fair division for some special cases considered in Section 5.2. In
this section, we propose market allocations that might be useful in general.
A non-empty core does not have to imply that there are also market allocations in the core as we have
seen in Example 3. Therefore, we first analyze how often there are market allocations in the core. We
determine this by checking whether there are core allocations that satisfy equation (3) with pi = pj for all
i, j ∈ N (see Appendix B.2 for a full description). We disregard the instances with an empty core. The
results can be found in Figure 4.
The pattern in Figure 4 is comparable to the pattern in Figure 3, with always a market allocation in the
core for very few resources or many resources. For limited amounts of resources with d ∈ [0.5, 3], the fraction
of instances with a market allocation in the core is lower. For those moderate amounts of resources, the
total return that coalitions can obtain can vary substantially. For some players it is beneficial to cooperate,
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Figure 4: This figure presents the fraction of instances with five players for which there exists a market
price allocation in the core. We take the average over 500 generated instances and we analyze both identical
return functions ( ) and individual return functions ( ).
whereas others can hardly improve their return. This implies that in the grand coalition, some players are
much better off, but others could have achieved also a high return in a smaller coalition. Hence, the players
assign a different value to the resources that they receive in the grand coalition and a market price does not
always exists.
Additional experiments, not reported here, show that the pattern in the curves in Figure 4 is similar for
instances with more players. For d ≤ 0.05 and d > 5 this fraction is not affected by the number of players
and remains approximately equal to 1. However, for d ∈ [0.5, 3] the fraction for which there is a market
allocation in the core is decreasing in the number of players. This fraction even drops below 0.05 for d = 0.5
and instances with ten players and individual type (ii) return functions. To conclude, when the core is often
empty, cooperation is complicated and a market allocation does not always exist in the core. But for settings
in which the core is often non-empty, there is also likely to be a market allocation in the core.
It is therefore worthwhile to derive analytical expressions of market prices of which the corresponding
market allocation is likely to be in the core. In order to do so, we make use of our theoretical results
in Section 5.2. The market prices that result in core allocations in Theorems 3 and 4 are both equal to
A(N). Let us analyze the expression for A(N) in more detail for the case of individual return functions. By
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equation (5):
A(N) =
v(N)−∑i∈N MiFi(0)
R(N)
=
1
R(N)
[∑
i∈N
Mi (Fi(f
∗
i )− Fi(0))
]
=
1
R(N)
[∑
i∈N
Mif
∗
i DFi(f
∗
i )
] (6)
Above analysis shows that A(N) is a weighted average of the functions DFi(·) evaluated at the optimal
solution f∗. Under the assumption of identical return functions and under the conditions on R(N) of
Theorems 3 and 4 the expression for A(N) can be simplified substantially and rewritten as follows: A(N) =
DF (f
∗
j ) where j ∈ N is such that f∗j > 0. This result follows directly from the optimal solution f∗ given
in Theorem 2. The simplification indicates that it is worthwhile to consider other candidate market prices
next to A(N) that are also functions of DFi(f
∗
i ) for all i ∈ N for situations where the return functions are
not identical.
Since we use an approximation of the value function, we do not know f∗. We therefore use our heuristic
solution to construct the market allocations. We propose four market prices, that bring about market
allocations. A market allocation with price p has the following structure, where g∗ ∈ RN denotes the
heuristic solution for the grand coalition:
xi = MiFi(g
∗
i ) + p(ri − g∗iMi) ∀i ∈ N.
We use the following indices to describe our market prices. Let k ∈ arg min{DFj (g∗j )|g∗j > 0, j ∈ N}, which
always exists for R(N) > 0. Let l ∈ arg min{DFj (g∗j )|g∗j ≥ f˜Fj , j ∈ N}. The index l only exists if there
are enough resources such that there is a player j ∈ N for which g∗j ≥ f˜Fj . We propose the following four
market prices:
1. p1 =
∑
i∈N MiFi(g
∗
i )−
∑
i∈N MiFi(0)
R(N) ,
2. p2 = DFk(g
∗
k),
3. p3 =

DFl(g
∗
l ) if a player l exists
DFk(g
∗
k) otherwise
,
4. p4 =

F ′l (g
∗
l ) if a player l exists
F ′k(g
∗
k) otherwise
.
The first market price p1 is equal to the weighted average of the functions DFi(g
∗
i ) for all i ∈ N . This price
follows the same structure as A(N). For the second and third market price, we use one of the smaller values
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of DFi(g
∗
i ) that contribute to the weighted average. Intuitively, these smaller values are good candidates for
core allocations, because of the following. Players for which g∗i > 0 have probably bought resources and they
have often obtained a higher average revenue per resource than p2 or p3. Similarly, players for which g
∗
i = 0
have sold their resources. For them a price p2 or p3 is such that the money they get from selling is higher
than the return they would have obtained by keeping their resources.
Market price p1 corresponds to the theoretical market price of Theorems 3 and 4 and is related to A(N).
In Theorem 5 we studied the case of many resources and derived that the market allocation in the core has
a market price which is lower than A(N). We therefore also propose a market price p4 based on this result.
The market allocation corresponding to p4 is expected to perform well for instances with many resources.
6.3 Numerical results
To evaluate our proposed market allocations, we compare their performance with three proportional alloca-
tions as a benchmark. For both the market allocations and the proportional allocations we use the heuristic
to determine the return that a coalition of players can achieve. In a proportional allocation, the total return
v¯(N), determined with the heuristic, is divided proportionally among the players with respect to a certain
player specific characteristic zi:
xi = v¯(N)
(
zi∑
j∈N zj
)
∀i ∈ N.
We use the following benchmark allocations:
1. the proportional allocation based on size (i.e., pro rata): zi = Mi for all i ∈ N ,
2. the proportional allocation based on initial resources: zi = ri for all i ∈ N ,
3. the proportional allocation based on initial return: zi = MiFi
(
ri
Mi
)
for all i ∈ N .
We analyze how often an allocation lies in the core using the same settings as in Section 6.1 to generate
instances. Figure 5 presents the results for d ∈ {0.05, 0.5, 1, ..., 4}. We cannot include d = 0, because several
of our proposed market prices do not exists for d = 0.
We observe in Figure 5 that the total amount of resources, implicitly measured by d, has a big influence
on the performance of the allocations. For very small amounts of resources (d = 0.05) the market allocations
are in the core for almost all instances and cooperation can easily be achieved.
When resources are limited, but not very scarce (d ∈ [0.5, 1.5]), it heavily depends on the problem instance
whether the proposed allocations are in the core. Although the market allocations are slightly more often in
the core than the proportional allocations, most of the time none of the compared allocations is in the core.
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Figure 5: This figure presents the average proportion of instances for which the allocations belong to the
core for various values of d. The average is taken over the number of instances for which the core was
non-empty out of 500 generated instances.
This happens for example in more than 80% of the instances with a non-empty core for d = 1 and individual
return functions of type (ii).
For large amounts of resources (d > 2) market allocation 4 performs the best. This market allocation
corresponds to the theoretical results on large amounts of resources in Theorem 5. The good performance of
market allocation 4 was therefore to be expected for identical return functions, but we also see this behavior
for individual return functions of both type (i) and (ii).
For return functions of type (ii) also proportional allocation 2 performs well when there are many resources
available. This proportional allocation divides the total return proportional to the initial amount of resources.
Indeed, for return functions of type (ii) the initial amount of resources of a player provides a good proxy for
the players contribution to a coalition. The parameters of the return function have a smaller influence on
the contribution of a player to a coalition, because return functions of type (ii) level off for high amounts of
resources.
27
Thus, we can conclude that when cooperation is plausible, market allocations often result in a fair
allocation of the total return. When resources are scarce, market allocation 1 (corresponding to market
price A(N)) is often in the core. When there are many resources, market allocation 4 is the best candidate.
Cooperation is more complicated for moderate amounts of resources, even though market allocations still
perform better than proportional allocations.
7 Case Study
In this section, we apply our results to a case study. We return to the application of vaccination that we
discussed in the first sections of this paper. We describe the case in Section 7.1 and present our results in
Section 7.2.
7.1 Case description
In the United States, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) is responsible for allocating
influenza vaccines during an influenza epidemic. The policy is to allocate vaccines to geographical regions in
proportion to their population size (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2009a). In this section, we
will investigate if, under such an initial distribution of vaccines, there is potential for collaboration during a
influenza epidemic (e.g., by redistribution some of the vaccines). For that, we use the cooperative game as
introduced in Section 3.
To model the influenza epidemic, we use the SIR model, which is a seminal model in epidemiology
(Kermack & McKendrick, 1927). The US population is divided into the ten regions defined by Teytelman
and Larson (2013), who study vaccine allocation during the 2009 H1N1 epidemic in the United States. We
use the disease parameters of this epidemic as provided by Teytelman and Larson (2013). The regions and the
corresponding number of inhabitants are presented in Table 1. The total population size equals 298,106,893
individuals. For a complete overview of which states belong to which region, we refer to Teytelman and
Larson (2013). In contrast to Teytelman and Larson (2013), we assume a single vaccination moment.
To obtain good estimates of the value function, we use a realistic return function Fi(·) for every region
i based on epidemiological models and disease parameters from the literature. The return function Fi(·)
measures the fraction of people that escapes infection in region i. In line with Teytelman and Larson (2013),
we assume that the epidemic in every region is independent of the epidemic in other regions. This is a
reasonable assumption, because the interaction of individuals within a region is much higher than between
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Region Size (Mi) Region Size (Mi)
1. New England 14,429,720 6. Southwest 37,860,549
2. New York Area 19,949,192 7. The Plains 13,610,802
3. Mid-Atlantic 28,891,734 8. Rocky Mountains 10,787,806
4. Southeast 60,580,377 9. West 47,495,705
5. Great Lakes 51,766,882 10. Pacific Northwest 12,734,126
Table 1: Number of inhabitants of the ten regions in the United States (Teytelman & Larson, 2013).
regions. This implies that Fi(·) only depends on input variables related to region i. It has been shown that
the function Fi(·) satisfies Assumption 1 if the epidemic is modeled with the SIR model (L. E. Duijzer, van
Jaarsveld, Wallinga, & Dekker, 2018). We refer to Appendix C for a full characterization of this function
and for an overview of the input parameters. This return function is more complex than the return functions
studied before and has characteristics of both type (i) and type (ii) functions, which can be seen in Figure 6.
The moderate increase resembles type (i) return functions, whereas the horizontal part matches the shape
of type (ii) functions.
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Figure 6: The return function F1(·) for region 1 when vaccination takes place directly at the start of the
epidemic. The full characterization of the function and the input parameters can be found in Appendix C.
The fraction of people that escapes infection can be translated to health benefits by multiplying with a
factor that accounts for the average health benefits per individual spared from infection. Here, we assume
that this factor is the same for every region, which is reasonable because all regions correspond to the same
country. This implies that we can maximize the total number of people that escapes infection instead of the
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monetary health benefits.
7.2 Case results
In this section, we analyze cooperation between the regions. We vary the total amount of available vaccines
and the moment of vaccination to analyze in which cases the core is non-empty. We also study whether
there is a market allocation in the core.
Let V denote the total amount of vaccines of all regions together and let τ denote the moment of
vaccination in days after the epidemic has started at time 0. Note that V = R(N). In line with the policy
of the CDC, we assume that the V available vaccines are initially distributed pro rata over the regions. We
assume that the moment of vaccination is the same for every region. We let τ ∈ {0, 5, 10, 15, 20, ..., 50} and
V ∈ {0, 0.5 · 107, 1 · 106, ..., 3 · 108}. Figure 7 shows for every combination of τ and V whether the core is
empty or not.
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Figure 7: This figure illustrates the non-emptiness of the core for various combinations of the total vaccine
stockpile (V ) and the moment of vaccination (τ) using the disease parameters of Teytelman and Larson
(2013).
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Additional results, not reported here, show that the core is non-empty for V ≤ 2.5 · 106 for almost all
τ ≥ 0. We therefore find that the core is non-empty when there are sufficient resources available or almost no
resources. This is in line with the findings of Figure 3. Moreover, if we analyze Figure 7 in more detail, we can
derive that the dark area with sufficient resources and a non-empty core has interesting characteristics. We
note that for the return function considered here, ˜fFi depends on τ for all i ∈ N . Particularly,
∑
i∈N ˜fFiMi
decreases from 3.6× 107 when τ = 0 to 0 for τ ≥ 40. Based on this, we can approximately say that the core
is non-empty when V >
∑
i∈N ˜fFiMi. This is in line with our theoretical results in Section 5.2. The return
functions on which Figure 7 is based are different for every region. In Appendix C, we report similar results
for the case of identical return functions.
The intuition behind the fact that ˜fFi is decreasing in τ is that the later you vaccinate, the more people
are already infected and you are almost only vaccinating people that would not have become infected in
the first place. If τ is very large, vaccination is too late to be very effective and the return functions do
no longer have a convex part, which implies that ˜fFi = 0. In that case, our cooperative game has concave
return functions and it is equivalent to a market game for which the core is always non-empty.
Figure 7 also shows that outside the connected area with non-empty core and sufficient vaccines, there
are only a few points for which the core is non-empty. There is no clear pattern for which combinations of
V and τ this is the case. Sometimes these points are related to combinations of V and τ for which there are
approximately enough vaccines to vaccinate a subset of the regions with their fraction f˜Fi , but not always.
This implies that for moderate amounts of resources it is very difficult to say beforehand whether the core
is non-empty and a fair allocation of the total return exists.
In addition to analyzing the non-emptiness of the core, we also study whether there are market allocations
in the core. These numerical results, not reported here, show that when the core is non-empty, there almost
always exists a market allocation in the core. For large amounts of vaccines (V > 5 × 107), the market
allocation with market price p4 is often in the core. This is in line with our findings in Figure 5. For
moderate amounts of resources and a non-empty core, most of the time none of the market allocations that
we proposed in Section 6.2 is in the core. Thus, even if cooperation can be achieved through trading all
resources for a market price, there does not need to be an analytical expression for the market price that
results in a fair allocation.
To conclude, the results for this case study confirm that cooperation is a delicate matter. Only when the
amount of vaccines is very small or above a certain threshold, approximately characterized by
∑
i∈N f˜FiMi,
all players are willing to cooperate with each other and a market price is possible. In case of moderate
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shortages, cooperation is likely not possible. This is reasonable, because vaccines have the most value when
they are reasonably scarce. Only in that case the health benefits in your region will be heavily affected
when part of the available vaccines is given away. This reduces the willingness of regions to cooperate and
share their vaccines. The CDC only allows health agencies to redistribute and trade their vaccines in case of
emergencies, such a late deliveries and unexpected shortages (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,
2009b). Our results thus show that when the CDC allows for cooperation, it is complicated to establish it
and it might not even be possible. Only when there is a severe shortage of vaccines, cooperation might be
an option and the vaccines can be traded for a market price. In all other realistic cases, cooperation is more
complicated and perhaps not even possible.
8 Discussion and conclusion
This paper analyzes the redistribution of resources and cooperation between players. The return that players
obtain from the resources is modeled via an S-shaped return function. Such a function captures convex
returns for limited amounts of resources and concave returns in case of many resources. We use the concept
of the core from cooperative game theory to analyze whether cooperation between the players is plausible.
We derive theoretical conditions under which cooperation is plausible and we show that the resources can
be traded for a market price in those cases. We perform numerical analysis to generalize these findings. Our
numerical results show that parties are most likely willing to cooperate when the total amount of resources
is limited or very large. A case study on the redistribution of vaccines confirms these findings.
With our analysis, we provide insights into general cooperation problems. Typically, cooperation leads
to increased total benefits. This is particularly true for return functions with a convex part, such as the S-
shaped return functions that are considered here. This seems to indicate that cooperation is worth pursuing.
However, cooperation is only plausible when the resources can be traded among the players for prices that
satisfy all participating players. Such prices may not always exist. Moreover, the S-shape of the return
function actually makes it less likely that such prices exist. Hence, one must be careful when investigating
potential cooperation between players. In addition, we find that, when cooperation is plausible, there is
often just a single price for which resources are traded. Such a market price is likely to enhance cooperation
in practice, because it prevents having dissatisfied players who found out that other players have bought
resources for a lower price.
The results in this paper are established under some assumptions. First of all, we assume that the
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resources can be exchanged among players and that a player can assign a monetary value to the return
he obtains from a certain number of resources. This allows a general formulation of the problem that can
be applied to various types of resources. In case of vaccines, this implies that a health agency might sell
some vaccines and receive money as compensation for an increased number of infections. Although it seems
unethical to compare health with money, this approach is common in health economics literature (e.g.,
Neumann, Sanders, Russell, Siegel, & Ganiats, 2016).
Our theoretical results are only valid when players have identical return functions, but our numerical
results in Section 6 extend these findings to individual return functions for all players. In addition, we
assume that players are independent of each other. The return of one player does not depend on the
amount of resources given to other players. It heavily depends on the context whether this assumption is
reasonable. In case of vaccination, the assumption of no interaction is legitimate when the players correspond
to geographically distant regions and when the interaction within a region is much larger than between regions
(Mamani et al., 2013; Sun et al., 2009; Wu et al., 2007). It would be interesting to include interaction between
the players, although this would complicate the analysis of the cooperative game in two dimensions. Firstly,
the return functions are more complex if they dependent on each other. Secondly, determining the value
function is more difficult, because it requires additional assumptions on the actions taken by players outside
the coalition.
We use the concept of the core to determine whether cooperation is plausible and whether the total return
can be divided in a fair way among the players. The advantage of core allocations is that they guarantee
that any player will never be worse off by cooperating with all other players, neither by working on his
own nor by cooperating with a subset of the players. A drawback is that core allocations do not always
exist. As an alternative, one could exclude the coalitional stability conditions for some coalitions for which
it is unlikely (e.g., due to geographical or political reasons) that they would cooperate. This results in a
so-called restricted game (see, e.g., Faigle, 1989). In a restricted game the collection of coalitions that need
to satisfy the stability conditions need not contain all subsets of players. As a consequence, the core of a
restricted game is ‘larger’ than the original core and thus might be non-empty (while the core of the original
game is empty). Another possibility is to keep all coalitions, but to relax some of the coalitional stability
conditions with a fixed constant or factor. These generalization of the core, that do include some overhead
for deviation of coalitions, are better known as the least-core (Maschler, Peleg, & Shapley, 1979) and the
multiplicative -core (Faigle & Kern, 1993), respectively. Moreover, one could also focus on other well-known
game theoretical solution concepts, like the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953), the nucleolus (Schmeidler, 1969),
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or the τ -value (Driessen & Tijs, 1985). These solutions concept have proven to be applicable in various
settings and rely on other interesting fairness properties than coalitional stability. Further research could
study such alternative fair allocations for our game.
Our results demonstrate that cooperation is a delicate matter. Often it is not possible to divide the total
benefits in such a way that all parties are willing to cooperate. But if cooperation is an option, we provide
an intuitive and fair way to divide the total benefits by trading all resources for a market price.
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Appendices
Appendix A Proofs
Theorem 1. In the case of two players (i.e., |N | = 2) the core is equal to the set of all market allocations
with a market price
p ∈
Ms
[
Fs
(
rs
Ms
)
− Fs(f∗s )
]
rs −Msf∗s
,
Mb
[
Fb(f
∗
b )− Fb
(
rb
Mb
)]
Mbf∗b − rb
 .
Proof. We use the subscripts 1 and 2 to refer to the two players without specifying which player is the seller
and which player is the buyer. Furthermore, we assume by Lemma 1 that f∗1M1 +f
∗
2M2 = r1 +r2. We prove
this theorem along the following lines:
(i) For two player games, all core allocations are market price allocations.
(ii) A market price allocation can only be in the core if p is in the given interval.
(iii) This interval is non-empty.
First, we show that all core-allocations are market price allocations in two player games. Let (z1, z2) denote
a core allocation. By efficiency of the core, the following holds:
z1 + z2 = M1F1(f
∗
1 ) +M2F2(f
∗
2 ) = v(N) (7)
Introduce a price pj for player j, with:
pj =
zj −MjFj(f∗j )
rj − f∗jMj
Because the core allocation is individually rational, we know that zj ≥ MjFj(rj/Mj). By the fact that the
functions Fj(f) are non-decreasing, this implies that pj ≥ 0 for j = 1, 2. The following analysis shows that
p1 = p2:
p1 =
z1 −M1F1(f∗1 )
r1 − f∗1M1
by definition
=
z2 −M2F2(f∗2 )
f∗1M1 − r1
by equation (7)
=
z2 −M2F2(f∗2 )
r2 − f∗2M2
= p2 by Lemma 1
Since p1 = p2 = p, we conclude that p is a market price. Thus, any core allocation is a market price
allocation.
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Secondly, we show that a market price allocation can only be in the core if p is in the given interval.
W.l.o.g. let player 1 be the seller and player 2 the buyer: i.e., f∗1M1 < r1 and f
∗
2M2 > r2. Consider the
following allocation with market price p:
x1 = M1F1(f
∗
1 ) + p(r1 − f∗1M1)
x2 = M2F2(f
∗
2 ) + p(r2 − f∗2M2)
We will show that allocation (x1, x2) is in the core if and only if p is in the interval provided in the theorem.
Efficiency: By Lemma 1 we know that
M1f
∗
1 +M2f
∗
2 = r1 + r2. (8)
This implies the following:
x1 + x2 = M1F1(f
∗
1 ) + p(r1 − f∗1M1) +M2F2(f∗2 ) + p(r2 − f∗2M2) = M1F1(f∗1 ) +M2F2(f∗2 ) = v(N).
The last equality follows from the optimality of (f∗1 , f
∗
2 ).
Stability: Note that for |N | = 2, we only have to verify that xi ≥ v({i}) for i = 1, 2. We start with i = 1:
x1 ≥ v({1})
⇔ M1F1(f∗1 ) + p(r1 − f∗1M1) ≥M1F1
(
r1
M1
)
⇔ p ≥
M1
[
F1
(
r1
M1
)
− F1(f∗1 )
]
r1 −M1f∗1
(9)
Recall that player 1 sold part of his recourses. Above inequality shows that he requires a minimum price per
resource to be willing to sell. Analogously, we can derive that player 2 is willing to pay at most the following
maximum price:
p ≤
M2
[
F2(f
∗
2 )− F2
(
r2
M2
)]
M2f∗2 − r2
. (10)
Hence, (x1, x2) is in the core if and only if p satisfies conditions (9) and (10), which corresponds to the
interval for p given in the theorem.
We finish the proof by showing that the interval for p is non-empty. By optimality of (f∗1 , f
∗
2 ) the following
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inequality holds:
M1F1
(
r1
M1
)
+M2F2
(
r2
M2
)
≤M1F1(f∗1 ) +M2F2(f∗2 )
⇔ M1
[
F1
(
r1
M1
)
− F1(f∗1 )
]
≤M2
[
F2(f
∗
2 )− F2
(
r2
M2
)]
⇔
M1
[
F1
(
r1
M1
)
− F1(f∗1 )
]
r1 −M1f∗1
≤
M2
[
F2(f
∗
2 )− F2
(
r2
M2
)]
M2f∗2 − r2
The first equivalence follows from rewriting and the second holds by (8) and by the assumption that r1 −
M1f
∗
1 > 0. The final inequality implies that the interval for p is non-empty.
We have thus shown that the complete core of a two player game can be described by the market
allocations with a market price in the given non-empty interval. This completes the proof of this theorem.
Theorem 3. Consider identical return functions (Fi(·) = F (·) for all i ∈ N) and let k ∈ arg mini∈N{Mi}.
If R(N) < f˜FMk, then the market allocation with price DF
(
R(N)
Mk
)
is in the core. This implies that the core
is non-empty.
Proof. We will show that the allocation with market price p = DF
(
R(N)
Mk
)
is in the core, which directly
implies that the core is non-empty.
By Theorem 2 we know that f∗k =
R(N)
Mk
and f∗j = 0 for all j ∈ N\{k}. The market price allocation is
defined as follows:
xk = MkF
(
R(N)
Mk
)
+ p(rk −R(N))
xj = MjF (0) + prj for all j ∈ N\{k}
Efficiency: The market allocation satisfies efficiency by construction and by Lemma 1.
Stability: Recall that R(S) =
∑
i∈S ri for any S ⊆ N . To study the stability of our proposed allocation,
we first note the following:
R(S)
Mj
≤ R(N)
Mj
≤ R(N)
Mk
≤ f˜F ∀S ⊂ N, ∀j ∈ N,
where the last inequality follows from the fact that R(N) ≤ f˜FMk. By Corollary 1 above relation implies
that
DF
(
R(S)
Mj
)
≤ p ∀S ⊂ N, ∀j ∈ N. (11)
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We will now analyse stability for all S ⊂ N . We distinguish between the following two cases: (i) k ∈ S
and (ii) k /∈ S. We start with case (i):
v(S) = MkF
(
R(S)
Mk
)
+
∑
i∈S\{k}
MiF (0) by Theorem 2
= xk + p(R(N)− rk)−Mk
[
F
(
R(N)
Mk
)
− F
(
R(S)
Mk
)]
+
∑
i∈S\{k}
(xi − pri) by definition of [xi]i∈N
=
∑
i∈S
xi − pR(S) + pR(N)−Mk
[
F
(
R(N)
Mk
)
− F
(
R(S)
Mk
)]
=
∑
i∈S
xi − pR(S) +Mk
[
F
(
R(N)
Mk
)
− F (0)
]
−Mk
[
F
(
R(N)
Mk
)
− F
(
R(S)
Mk
)]
by definition of p
=
∑
i∈S
xi − pR(S) +DF
(
R(S)
Mk
)
R(S) by definition of DF (·)
≤
∑
i∈S
xi by (11)
Let us now consider case (ii), i.e., k /∈ S. W.l.o.g. let j ∈ arg min{Mi : i ∈ S}. Because R(S) ≤ f˜FMk ≤ f˜FMj ,
it is optimal to give all resources to player j. This implies that:
v(S) = MjF
(
R(S)
Mj
)
+
∑
i∈S\{j}
MiF (0) by Theorem 2
=
∑
i∈S
xi − pR(S) +Mj
[
F
(
R(S)
Mj
)
− F (0)
]
by definition of [xi]i∈N
=
∑
i∈S
xi − pR(S) +DF
(
R(S)
Mj
)
R(S) by definition of DF (·)
≤
∑
i∈S
xi by (11)
The market price allocation with p = DF
(
R(N)
Mk
)
satisfies both the efficiency condition and stability conditions.
Hence, it is a core allocation which implies that the core is non-empty. This completes the proof.
Theorem 4. Consider identical return functions (Fi(·) = F (·) for all i ∈ N). If R(N) = f˜F
∑
i∈KMi for
some K ⊆ N , then the market allocation with price DF
(
f˜F
)
is in the core. This implies that the core is
non-empty.
Proof. Let (f∗i )i∈N denote the optimal solution for the problem underlying v(N). By Theorem 2 this solution
is of the following form: f∗i = f˜F for all i ∈ K and f∗i = 0 for all i ∈ N\{K}.
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Let us now define the market price allocation as follows:
xi = MiF (f
∗
i ) + p (ri − f∗iMi) ∀i ∈ N
Efficiency: Using Lemma 1 we derive the efficiency of the market price allocation:
∑
i∈N
xi =
∑
i∈N
[MiF (f
∗
i ) + p (ri − f∗iMi)]
=
∑
i∈N
MiF (f
∗) + p
(∑
i∈N
ri −
∑
i∈N
f∗Mi
)
=
∑
i∈N
MiF (f
∗) = v(N).
Hence, the proposed allocation satisfies efficiency.
Stability: To study the stability of our proposed market price allocation, we will use duality theory for
convex optimization problems. Since Problem (1) is not a convex optimization problem, we will introduce a
new convex optimization problem using the upper convex envelope of the function F (·).
We introduce the function G(·), the upper convex envelope of F (·):
G(f) =

F (0) + fDF (f˜F ) for f < f˜F
F (f) for f ≥ f˜F
(12)
One can verify that G(·) is a concave function, because it is linear on [0, f˜F ) and concave on [f˜F ,+∞)
(L. E. Duijzer, van Jaarsveld, Wallinga, & Dekker, 2018). Furthermore, G(f) ≥ F (f) for all f ≥ 0. The
function G(·) is also continuous and differentiable, because F ′(f˜F ) = DF (f˜F ) by (4). Let us introduce the
following optimization problem:
v2(S) = max
∑
i∈S
MiG (fi)
s.t.
∑
i∈S
fiMi ≤
∑
i∈S
ri
fi ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ S
(13)
Problem (13) is a convex optimization problem, because it is a maximization problem with linear constraints
involving a concave objective function. For this convex optimization problem, we can formulate the following
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Wolfe Dual (Wolfe, 1961):
D(S) = min
∑
i∈S
MiG (fi) + λ
[∑
i∈S
ri −
∑
i∈S
fiMi
]
+
∑
i∈S
µifi
s.t. MiG
′(fi)− λMi + µi = 0 ∀i ∈ S
µi ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ S
λ ≥ 0
(14)
In above problem G′(f) denotes the derivative of the function G(f) with respect to f . Observe that the objective
function of the Wolfe Dual problem is equal to the Lagrangian function of Problem (13) after relaxing all constraints.
The KKT conditions of Problem (13) function as constraints in the dual problem. We will now construct a solution
to the dual problem (14) using the optimal solution (f∗i )i∈N :
fi = f
∗
i = f˜F ∀i ∈ K
fi = f
∗
i = 0 ∀i ∈ N\{K}
λ = G′(f˜F )
µi = 0 ∀i ∈ N
(15)
By construction of the function G(·) we have that G′(f˜F ) = G′(0). It can be verified that above solution satisfies
the constraints of Problem (14). It is therefore a feasible solution for the dual problem. We analyze the objective
function corresponding to this feasible solution:
Objective =
∑
i∈S
MiG (f
∗
i ) +G
′(f˜F )
[∑
i∈S
ri −
∑
i∈S
f∗iMi
]
+
∑
i∈S
µif
∗
i
=
∑
i∈S
[
MiG (f
∗
i ) + F
′(f˜F ) (ri − f∗iMi)
]
=
∑
i∈S
[MiF (f
∗
i ) + p (ri − f∗iMi)]
=
∑
i∈S
xi
In above derivation, we use that G′(f˜F ) = F ′(f˜F ) = D(f˜F ) = p. We also use that G(f) = F (f) for f = 0 and for
f ≥ f˜ . Above derivation shows that objective function of the Wolfe Dual problem for the solution in (15) is equal to
the sum of the market allocations for all the players in S. We can now prove the stability of our allocation for any
S ⊂ N :
∑
i∈S
xi ≥ D(S) because of the feasibility of (15) in (14)
≥ v2(S) because of weak duality
≥ v(S) because G(f) ≥ F (f)
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We have thus shown that the market price allocation with price p = DF
(
f˜F
)
, is both efficient and stable. Therefore,
this allocation is in the core, which completes the proof.
Theorem 5. Consider identical return functions (Fi(·) = F (·) for all i ∈ N). If R(N) ≥ f˜F
∑
i∈N Mi, then
the allocation with the market price F ′
(
R(N)∑
i∈N Mi
)
is in the core. This implies that the core is non-empty.
Proof. The proof of this theorem is very similar to the proof of Theorem 4. We therefore only present
the points where the proof is different. First, we note that in our current theorem the optimal solution
corresponding to v(N) is of the following form by Theorem 2: f∗i =
R(N)∑
i∈N Mi
for all i ∈ N . Since f∗i is the
same for all i ∈ N , we denote this value with f∗.
Analogous to the proof of Theorem 4 we construct a solution to the dual problem (14) using the optimal
solution (f∗i )i∈N :
fi = f
∗
i = f
∗ ∀i ∈ N
λ = G′(f∗)
µi = 0 ∀i ∈ N
(16)
One can verify that the solution proposed in (16) is feasible for the dual problem (14). We analyze the
objective function corresponding to this feasible solution:
Objective =
∑
i∈S
MiG (f
∗) +G′(f∗)
[∑
i∈S
ri −
∑
i∈S
f∗Mi
]
+
∑
i∈S
µif
∗
=
∑
i∈S
[MiG (f
∗) + F ′(f∗) (ri − f∗Mi)]
=
∑
i∈S
[MiF (f
∗) + p (ri − f∗Mi)]
=
∑
i∈S
xi
In above derivation, we use that f∗ ≥ f˜F , such that G(f∗) = F (f∗) and G′(f∗) = F ′(f∗). Above derivation
shows that objective function of the Wolfe Dual problem for the solution in (16) is equal to the sum of the
market allocations for all the players in S. Analogous to the proof of Theorem 4 this implies that the market
price allocation with p = F ′(f∗) = F ′
(
R(N)∑
i∈N Mi
)
is in the core. This completes the proof.
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Appendix B Numerical results
In Section 6, we perform numerical experiments and we analyze cooperation for randomly generated in-
stances. We use the core of a game to investigate whether cooperation is possible. In Sections B.1 and B.2,
we respectively explain how we construct the core and how we determine whether it is empty or not.
B.1 Approximation of the value function
The conditions that describe the core depend on the value function v(·). Since the value function is difficult
to determine in our case, due to the complexity of the underlying decision problem, we approximate it using
the heuristic proposed by L. E. Duijzer, van Jaarsveld, Wallinga, and Dekker (2018), which is shown to
perform close to optimal for a similar optimization problem. Let [g∗i ]i∈S denote the solution obtained by the
heuristic for coalition S ⊆ N . This solution can be obtained as follows:
Heuristic Sort the players in S decreasingly based on DFi(f˜Fi).
Case (a) If R(S) <
∑
i∈SMif˜Fi , let k = min{i ∈ S|
∑i
j=1Mif˜Fi ≥ R(S)}. Then,
g∗i =

f˜i for i = 1, ..., k − 1
R(S)−∑k−1i=1 Mif˜Fi
Mk
for i = k
0 otherwise.
Case (b) If R(S) ≥∑i∈SMif˜Fi , then
g∗i = f˜Fi +
R(S)−∑i∈SMif˜Fi∑
i∈SMi
∀i ∈ S.
The goal of the heuristic is to distribute the resources in such a way that as many players as possible receive
their fraction f˜Fi (case (a)). To obtain the highest possible return, the ‘profitable’ players (i.e., players with
a high additional return per resource at f˜Fi) are prioritized over less profitable players by means of sorting.
If there are many resources available (case (b)), then all players receive f˜Fi and the remaining resources are
divided pro rata.
Let vH(S) denote the heuristic approximation of the value function for coalition S ⊆ N . Since the
heuristic does not solve Problem 1 to optimality, vH(·) does not always satisfy superadditivity. i.e., it is
possible that vH(S∪T ) < vH(S) +vH(T ) for some S, T ⊂ N with S∩T = ∅. For the original value function
v(·) this is not possible: the players in S and T will never be worse off if they cooperate, because they can
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always decide to keep their own resources. If vH(·) is not superadditive, then this will affect our analysis
of the core. To prevent this from happening, we first determine the approximated value function for all
S ⊆ N and then check for all the subsets in lexicographic order whether vH(S) satisfies superadditivity. If
not, we adjust the solution of the heuristic by setting vH(S) := maxK⊂S{vH(K) + vH(S\K)} to guarantee
superadditivity.
We compare this final heuristic solution to the outcome of a built-in function from Matlab that minimizes
non-linear programming problems. The solution approach of this built-in function is based on interior
point methods and barrier functions (c.f., Waltz, Morales, Nocedal, & Orban, 2006). This approach cannot
guarantee global optimality, but might outperform the heuristic on some instances. We use v¯(S) to denote
the best approximation of the value function for all coalitions S ⊆ N , which is the maximum of vH(S) and
the value of the solution found by the built-in function.
B.2 Analysis of the core
We explain in this section how we can determine whether the core is empty and whether a market price
allocation exists in the core.
We determine whether the core is empty with the equations that characterize the core. Recall that when
we talk about the core, we technically mean the -core of the approximated game. We use  = 10−5. We
conclude that the core is non-empty if there is a solution [xi]i∈N to the following system of linear equations:∑
i∈N
xi = v¯(N)
∑
i∈S
xi ≥ v¯(S)−  ∀S ⊂ N
(17)
Similarly, we can use linear inequalities to determine whether there exists a market allocation in the core.
We use the following linear programming problem:
min pmax − pmin (18)∑
i∈N
xi = v¯(N) (19)
∑
i∈S
xi ≥ v¯(S)−  ∀S ⊂ N (20)
xi − pi (ri − f∗iMi) = MiFi (f∗i ) ∀i ∈ N (21)
pmax ≥ pi ∀i ∈ N (22)
pmin ≤ pi ∀i ∈ N (23)
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Constraints (19) and (20) guarantee that allocation x is in the core. The individual prices for each player
that correspond to allocation x are determined in constraints (21). The final constraints determine the
maximum and the minimum price. The objective is to minimize the difference between the maximum and
the minimum price, to find a solution for which all prices are (almost) equal. A market price is a price for
which pi = pj for all i, j ∈ N and such a price would result in an objective value equal to zero. Here, we
conclude that there exists a market allocation in the core if the objective value of Problem (18) - (23) is
smaller than  = 10−5.
Appendix C Case Study
In this appendix, we first describe the return functions that we use in the case study in Section 7. After
that, we present some additional numerical results in Section C.2.
C.1 Return function
The return function, denoted by Fi(·) for region i ∈ N , measures the proportion of people that escape
infection. We model the epidemic with the seminal SIR model (Kermack & McKendrick, 1927). This model
divides the population into three compartments: people are either susceptible (S), infected (I) or removed
(R). Let Si(t), Ii(t) and Ri(t) denote the number of individuals in each of the three compartments at time t.
The return function requires a number of input parameters. One important parameter is the basic
reproduction number, which is a measure for the speed of transmission: the higher the basic reproduction
number, the more secondary infections will be caused by a single infected person. Let σi denote the basic
reproduction number in region i, which is a measure for the severity of the disease, Mi denotes the number
of inhabitants in region i and τ is the moment of vaccination.
The return function can be characterized as follows, where fi is the fraction of the population in region
i that is vaccinated:
Fi(fi) =
−1
σi
W
[
−σi
(
1− Ii(0)
Mi
)(
1− fiMi
Si(τ)
)
exp{−σi(1− fi)}
]
+ fi
Si(τ)
Mi
(24)
In equation (24), W (·) denotes the Lambert W function (Corless, Gonnet, Hare, Jeffrey, & Knuth, 1996).
The return function Fi(·) represents the proportion of people in region i escaping infection. In the case
study, we maximize the total number of people escaping infection:
∑
i∈N MiFi(fi). We could translate
this objective function into the monetary health benefits of vaccination by introducing a parameter that
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represents the benefits of saving an individual from infection. We refer to L. E. Duijzer, van Jaarsveld,
Wallinga, and Dekker (2018) for more details on this return function.
We conduct two experiments: one with individual return functions for all regions and one with identical
return functions. Thereto, we respectively use the disease parameters from Teytelman and Larson (2013)
and Nguyen and Carlson (2016). These parameters can be found in Table 2. For both experiments we use
the following initial state: Ii(0) = 10
−4Mi for all i ∈ N .
Parameter Teytelman and Larson (2013) Nguyen and Carlson (2016)
Reproduction σ1 = 1.43 σ6 = 1.18 σi = 2 for all i ∈ N
number σ2 = 1.26 σ7 = 1.24
σ3 = 1.32 σ8 = 1.18
σ4 = 1.18 σ9 = 1.14
σ5 = 1.21 σ10 = 1.16
Duration
infectious period 2.3 days 6 23 days
Table 2: Overview of the disease parameters.
C.2 Results
We analyze the non-emptiness of the core for various combinations of the moment of vaccination τ and the
total amount of available vaccines V . In Section 7, we reported the results for the case of individual return
functions. The results for the identical return functions are comparable, which can be seen in Figure 8.
We note that for the return function considered in Figure 8 f˜F depends on τ and decreases from around
0.50 when τ = 0 to 0.20 for τ = 45 and f˜F equals 0 for τ ≥ 50. Based on this, we can derive that the small
dark area at the bottom of the graph with few resources and a non-empty core is approximately characterized
by V < f˜F mini∈N{Mi} and the area with many resources satisfies V > f˜F
∑
i∈N Mi. This is in line with
our theoretical results in Section 5.2.
Regarding which allocations are in the core, we find that for very few or many vaccines there almost
always exists a market allocation in the core. This is more often the case than in the case of individual
return functions. We also note that for large amounts of resources, the initial pro rata distribution of
vaccines is also optimal in the grand coalition. Hence, there is no need to redistribute resources when all
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Figure 8: This figure illustrates the non-emptiness of the core for various combinations of the total amount
of vaccines (V ) and the moment of vaccination (τ) using the disease parameters of Nguyen and Carlson
(2016).
regions cooperate and any market price would result in a core allocation. In line with our results in Section 7
we find that for moderate amounts of resources and a non-empty core, often none of our proposed market
allocations is in the core.
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